

Brief

Building an Implementation-Oriented Climate Governance Architecture

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This analysis builds on our 2026 policy brief [Reforming the UN Climate Governance System for an Implementation Context](#), which identified procedural and institutional challenges that limit the UN climate regime's ability to support effective Paris Agreement implementation. It raised a fundamental question this paper takes further: whether the regime's institutions and negotiating processes fit an era in which implementation, rather than rule-making, must become the central measure of success.

Recent assessments of the 1.5-degree climate overshoot ([UNEP, 2026](#))¹ and energy-system trajectories ([IEA, 2025](#))² show how far current policies and implementation still are from the Paris Agreement's goals. Yet COP negotiations continue to focus heavily on procedural matters, while key political and financial barriers to implementation remain unresolved. Formal negotiations and the institutional architecture built around them over the last decades must better provide collective political direction and address systemic barriers, while action initiatives, including those derived from the Action Agenda and other coalitions of doers, must demonstrate credible, accountable contributions to implementation. Neither can be considered successful without contributing to real-world trajectories.

To deepen that diagnosis and take our earlier recommendations a step further, we examined two interconnected dimensions of the wider UN climate architecture so as to understand how they are equipped to enable implementation, address systemic barriers and provide political direction:

- (i) the mandates, performance and implementation contributions of 17 constituted bodies and 6 multilateral climate funds to the Paris Agreement implementation, including the integration of GST1 outcomes into their work; and
- (ii) a review of the COP31, CMA8 and CMP21 negotiating agendas and their underlying mandates, assessing each item's function, political relevance, implementation leverage and contribution to accountability.

¹ United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), *Limiting Overshoot: Navigating Exceedance of 1.5°C and Pathways Towards Return*, (UNEP, 2026)

² International Energy Agency (IEA), *World Energy Outlook 2025*, (IEA, 2025).



The findings reinforce and refine our earlier diagnosis. The institutional review covering 17 constituted bodies and 6 operating entities of the Financial Mechanism³ currently working under the UN climate regime found that **43% of them make a direct contribution to accomplishing the Paris Agreement (PA); 22% do not demonstrate sufficiently that their functions relate to the Agreement's implementation; and 35% do not present a demonstrable contribution to Paris** within the scope and criteria of this review (see Annex below). Provided that the vast majority of constituted bodies (64%) were created before the Paris Agreement was adopted, their mandates, mechanisms and institutional arrangements could benefit from a reassessment of their relevance, coordination and effectiveness, to better respond to the current phase of the multilateral climate regime that combines the completion of the PA rulebook with a greater urgency to scale up speed and coverage of climate action through a system that delivers.

In parallel, analysis of the COP31, CMA8 and CMP21 agendas shows that recurring dialogue, reporting, reviews, and institutional decisions share a large negotiating space, leaving much less space for politically consequential implementation questions. Of the 96 items analyzed, only 14% could result in substantive decisions, compared with 86% that could be procedural in how they support the implementation of the Paris Agreement and GST outcomes. Thus, while COP annual agendas offer opportunities for technical and operational progress, this year's and subsequent mandated outcomes can only provide limited pathways to address some of the most consequential implementation gaps, particularly in mitigation and climate finance. This matters because investment and financing conditions remain insufficient to mobilize climate action at the required scale, and voluntary initiatives have yet to demonstrate a systemic shift in implementation trajectories. This underscores GST2's role in identifying implementation barriers, informing collective political direction and enabling course correction, starting at Antalya's COP with a clear road to get the necessary changes adopted at GST2.

The findings do not point to a single problem of underperformance; some bodies operate effectively within mandates that offer limited pathways to implementation; others have relevant functions but do not yet demonstrate sufficient uptake, scale or country-level results; and some depend on decisions, finance or institutional interfaces beyond their control. Across these categories, the central concern is the gap between institutional activity and timely, scaled and demonstrable facilitation and support for implementation. The COP31 agenda assessment adds a related finding: many mandated outputs involve considering reports, technical guidance, work-program reviews, and operational decisions. Together, these findings point to the need to strengthen the links between institutional mandates, negotiating outcomes and delivery on the ground. The following 10 recommendations identify where changes could make the greatest difference:

³ Bureau of the COP, CMP, and CMA, Global Environment Facility (GEF), Consultative Group of Experts (CGE), Least Developed Countries Experts Group, Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Adaptation Fund, Least Developed Countries Fund, Special Climate Change Fund, The Compliance Committee of the Kyoto Protocol, The Joint Supervisory Committee (JISC), Adaptation Fund Board, Adaptation Committee, Green Climate Fund (GCF), Technology Executive Committee (TEC), Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), Standing Committee on Finance, Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage, Article 6.4 Supervisory Body, Paris Committee on Capacity-building (PCCB), Paris Agreement Implementation and Compliance Committee (PAICC), Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform (LCIPP), Katowice Committee of Experts on the Impacts of the Implementation of Response Measures (KCI), and the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD).



1. Undertake a system-wide review of constituted bodies, linking institutional effectiveness to implementation results

The implementation phase of the Paris Agreement calls for a holistic review of all constituted bodies so they can work as a system, avoiding individual reviews only and assess the continued relevance of their mandates, complementarity, coordination and collective contribution to implementation. This should inform decisions on updating mandates, governance arrangements and working methods; addressing duplication and institutional gaps; and, where justified, consolidating or discontinuing functions that no longer serve a clear purpose. For this review, it is also essential to revisit the Secretariat's role to strengthen its position as an implementation facilitator. The PAICC, which already has a broader view of both Parties' performance and the climate regime, could undertake this overarching task as a resulting mandate from GST2.

A central component of this holistic review should be an internal common performance and accountability framework that shifts the focus from institutional activity to demonstrable implementation results. Reporting should distinguish activities, outputs, outcomes and impacts; assess contributions of bodies and funds to implementing GST1 sectoral outcomes and subsequent GST cycles; and demonstrate how institutional outputs are taken up by Parties, other bodies and relevant actors to inform policies, strengthen capacities or enable country-level implementation.

2. Systemic coordination amongst constituted bodies, funds, and other delivery arrangements is necessary

Move away from isolated, almost anecdotal exchanges toward systematically identifying complementarities, gaps, and potential duplications, and determining how one body's work can support another's mandate. Joint work should specify the problem to be resolved, each body's contribution, a common deliverable and a follow-up mechanism showing how the result was incorporated into work plans, technical assistance, finance or country support. The Just Transition Mechanism presents a critical test to this more systemic overview at COP31: its mandate explicitly requires complementing existing workstreams, while the Secretariat has been tasked with mapping relevant institutions and initiatives across the UNFCCC and UN system. With multiple bodies and programs already addressing aspects of just transition, it is now up to Parties to demonstrate that they can use this mapping to design a mechanism that fills concrete gaps in implementation support, rather than duplicating existing functions. COP31 should agree on its core functions and a time-bound pathway to operationalization, without allowing debates over the JTWP's continuation to derail progress. Otherwise, the process risks demonstrating precisely the institutional fragmentation and duplication this reform seeks to address. Assess coordination by what it unlocks, rather than by the number of meetings or exchanges held.

3. Reorient future COP agendas towards strategic political direction and implementation

COP31's predominantly procedural agenda exposes a growing disconnect between the business-as-usual negotiation model and the bolder political decisions needed to advance



climate ambition. Despite formal agenda items on mitigation and finance, neither offers a clear pathway to accelerate emissions reductions or deliver finance at scale. GST2 should become a central driver of the COP process, providing political direction, concrete implementation milestones and accountability for progress. In the same train of thought, future COPs in general should become mini GSTs where political clout is pursued every year too, in order to offer an additional possibility for annual system-wide assessments of progress on agreed commitments, including in relation to NDCs, LTS, NAPs, NCQG, GGA and GST outcomes, that lead towards annual decision-making for incremental delivery. This should inform a broader rethinking of future COP agendas, ensuring that procedural decision-making is done swiftly so that COPs focus on filling implementation gaps and deliver measurable progress towards the Paris Agreement's goals.

Where mandates permit, subsidiary bodies should technically review constituted-body reports and escalate to governing bodies only matters requiring political guidance, mandate changes, resource decisions or formal adoption. Multi-year reporting cycles and clustered consideration of related bodies could further reduce repetitive agenda time while preserving accountability to the COP and CMA.

4. Ensure that the Financial Mechanism of the climate regime responds in its entirety to the delivery of climate finance with a perspective of scale, speed and urgency

This includes providing a unified and coherent vision as to how its specific operating entities contribute to this objective and complement each other. While the multilateral climate funds (namely the [Green Climate Fund](#)⁴, the [Global Environmental Facility](#)⁵, the [Adaptation Fund](#)⁶, the [Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage](#)⁷, the Least Developed Countries Fund⁸ and the Special Climate Change Fund⁹, which together have historically allocated over USD 38 billion) do serve a direct purpose to implement the Paris Agreement, they do not count on the scale of financing needed to foster transformational action in developing countries, provided that needs enunciated by developing countries add up to [USD 5-6.8 trillion](#). Hence, delivering on the NCQG's financial commitments, i.e., the USD 300 billion, tripling the multilateral climate funds' financial outflows, and ultimately reaching the target of 1.3 trillion, is critical to addressing financial constraints and supporting climate transitions toward low-emissions, climate-resilient development. The SCF must address its current underperformance by rationalizing the Financial Mechanism as a system and its resource mobilization, and enhance these functions to better support the operationalization of the NCQG and address the gaps and barriers to unlock financing for developing countries.

5. The Technology Mechanism and capacity-building arrangements should be directly connected to implementing GST1 sectoral outcomes and national climate priorities

⁴ Allocation of USD 20.4 billion

⁵ Allocation of USD 16.5 billion, including for the SCCF and LDCF

⁶ Allocation of USD 1.6 billion

⁷ Contributions add up to USD 629 million

⁸ Allocation of USD 2.4 billion, already included as part of the GEF total allocations, provided that it acts as its trustee

⁹ Allocation of USD 450 million, already included as part of the GEF total allocations, provided that it acts as its trustee



The historical delivery of the technology and capacity-building-related bodies needs to be reassessed so that their performance is directed to supporting developing countries. Assess their performance through demonstrable technology uptake, strengthened national capacities and the removal of implementation barriers.

6. The absence of a constituted body that supports, directs and enables global mitigation efforts needs to be corrected

In a moment in time where the scientific consensus is telling us that we are heading to overshoot the 1.5°C paramount goal of the Paris Agreement with unknown but highly likely negative consequences, the climate regime must advance emissions reductions as fast and as vast as possible all over the world, and there has to be a body or committee that looks at this work in close coordination with the rest of the constituted bodies. Existing work programs and initiatives provide dialogue and technical exchange, but no constituted body has a continuing mandate to track global mitigation efforts and connect them to the implementation of the GST mitigation outcomes, identify cross-cutting barriers and connect to other relevant processes, such as how the mechanisms derived from Article 6 and/or means of implementation support these efforts. Furthermore, the negotiation agenda has continued to assess the MWP's continuity and functioning, without reaching consensus and despite questions about its capacity to translate dialogue into mitigation results. Any new arrangement should address a clearly defined institutional gap, build on and consolidate existing work, align with the TAFF and forest roadmaps, and inform future GSTs, rather than add another parallel structure.

7. Strengthen the connection between the Global Climate Action Agenda, government-led implementation initiatives and the formal regime

A more prominent role for the Action Agenda and a positive feedback loop of information, sectoral reporting and reinforcement of climate action from NSA to governmental action and vice versa, can improve understanding of global climate action and progress toward the PA long-term goals. With GST2 starting at COP31, initiatives intended to accelerate GST1 delivery must demonstrate progress and explain why implementation remains insufficient, particularly in the Global South. COP30 Presidency roadmaps on fossil fuels and forests and initiatives such as the Global Implementation Accelerator, the Belém Mission to 1.5 and COP31's Climate Implementation Bridge provide opportunities to translate GST1 outcomes into national implementation pathways, identify barriers and solutions, and connect climate priorities with finance and investment. Yet their proliferation also raises questions about additionality, complementarity, transparency and continuity beyond individual Presidencies. Their contribution should be assessed against their respective mandates, distinguishing political mobilization and identification of solutions from political ownership, dated milestones, finance, verified implementation and transparent follow-up, with evidence feeding into national reporting and the information collection and technical assessment of GST2 where appropriate. This should enable GST2 to assess not only where GST1 implementation has fallen short, but also whether the arrangements created to accelerate delivery are effectively addressing those gaps and what further political or institutional action is needed. A stronger interface should avoid duplicate claims and reporting burdens and preserve the distinct responsibilities of Parties and non-Party actors.



8. **Establish end-to-end implementation pathways for adaptation**

Developing countries have secured an important institutional architecture on adaptation, but knowledge, planning, technical assistance and finance remain insufficiently connected. Unlike mitigation, adaptation has dedicated substantive negotiating processes, including the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) and the Baku Adaptation Roadmap, supported by relevant technical work from constituted bodies. Yet political disagreements continue to constrain progress on operationalizing these outcomes, particularly their financing and means of implementation. COP31 must translate the commitment to triple adaptation finance by 2035 into a credible delivery pathway, with clear parameters for tracking progress and near-term milestones that provide confidence to developing countries. Parties should prioritize translating existing technical and institutional progress into actionable decisions, financing and measurable country-level results. Similarly, the Adaptation Fund's role and the maintenance of its Board structure are critical to ensuring sufficient mobilization of financial resources for adaptation in developing countries.

9. **Prioritize the operationalization and financing of loss and damage responses**

Although COP31 includes agenda items on the WIM and FRLD, it lacks a dedicated negotiating mandate to close the gap between identified loss-and-damage needs and financial delivery. For example, Nepal, facing catastrophic glacier melt and flooding, requested \$20 million from the Fund, the maximum amount that can be requested, even though actual damages are estimated at around \$2.7 billion. This implies that the WIM Executive Committee and Santiago Network should strengthen their links with FRLD implementation so that a system-wide response provides finance, technical assistance and support to developing countries when adaptation is no longer an option.

10. **It is high time to bring the KP to a dignified closure**

Once deadlines for the completion of its specific bodies' work have been set, its existence should formally end, while upholding the historical responsibility and necessary leadership of developed countries in global mitigation and in providing climate finance to support developing countries, as enshrined in the KP.



Annex – Analysis of the performance of constituted bodies in relation to the implementation of the PA

Name of constituted body	Operation		Implementation			Observations
	Year of establishment	Is there clarity regarding the body's mandate, purpose, and functions?	Is the mandate or the work of this constituted body enunciated in the Paris Agreement?	Does it have a direct link to the GST sectoral goals?	Do the body's work and results align with the implementation of the Paris Agreement?	
Bureau of the COP/CMP/CMA	1996	COP Draft Rules of Procedure				The core of the work of the Bureau is organizational rather than the substance of the implementation of either the UNFCCC, the KP or the PA; however, the lack of clarity in its procedural rules could allow for it to provide guidance as to how the regime is built better to support the implementation of the PA.
Consultative Group of Experts (CGE)	1999	Mandate/ToR: 11/CP.24 3/CP.8 14/CP.17 18/CP.18 CGE RoP 14/CP.26	Art. 13		Report 2025: Regional hands-on training workshops of the CGE , Report by the secretariat LUNFCCC , Workplan 2026-2029: Work Programme of the CGE 2026 - 2029	Capacity-building efforts remain critically needed to support developing country Parties in implementing the ETF, operationalizing the MPGs, and effectively preparing BTRs. Limited financial resources have largely constrained the CGE's contribution, preventing the Group from holding its customary regional workshops in 2025 and fully executing its mandates. Nevertheless, the Group has conducted some workshops and dialogues; for instance, in the Caribbean, over 90% of respondents deemed the knowledge gained directly relevant to their upcoming transparency reporting tasks. Against this backdrop, the new work plan (2026-2029) aims to strengthen ETF implementation by addressing implementation challenges and improving BTR and greenhouse gas inventory preparation, which could improve transparency and reporting on how countries contribute to emissions reductions.
Adaptation Fund Board (AFB)	2001	Decision 1/CMP.3, paras. 3-11, Decision 13/CMA.1	Art. 7 and 9		Report 2025	The AFB has a clear mandate and continues to operate effectively as it completes its transition from the Kyoto Protocol to the Paris Agreement, including the future operationalization of Article 6.4 revenue. These ongoing arrangements have not disrupted project approvals or delivery. Its direct-access model, portfolio and updated Strategic Results Framework provide a strong basis for supporting the UAE Framework and Paris implementation. However, a wider funding problem affects the whole financial mechanism, not an operational failure of the Board.
Executive Board Clean Development Mechanism (CDM EB)	2001	Decision 3/CMP.1				The ongoing transition from CDM CERs to the Art. 6.4 Mechanism by the end of December 2026 and the closure of the CDM Registry by mid 2027 will allow for the CDM EB to also close its work afterward, provided that it only responds to the KP.
Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LEG)	2001	Decision 29/CP.7, Decision 15/CP.26	Preamble, Art. 4, Art. 9.4 and 9.9, Art. 11.1, Art. 13.3		Report 2026	The LEG has a clear mandate and directly supports LDCs through country-requested assistance, training, NAP guidance and the development of financing pipelines. Its work contributes to implementing the Paris Agreement. Overlap with the Adaptation Committee requires a clearer division of labor. The LEG is integrating the UAE Framework targets and Belém Adaptation Indicators, but practical sectoral guidance and monitoring tools remain under development,



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						partly reflecting the late evolution of the negotiated indicators.
Compliance Committee under the Kyoto Protocol (CC)	2005	Art. 18 of the KP; Decisions 27/CMP.1 ; 4/CMP.2				The KP's eventual dignified closure will not directly affect PA implementation. The PAICC has adopted the CC of the KP's best practices.
Adaptation Committee (AC)	2010	Decision 2/CP.17, paras. 20–35	Art. 2.1b, 7 and 9.1 and 9.4		Report 2025, Workplan 2025–2027	The AC has a clear mandate and a substantial portfolio of technical guidance, MEL tools, NAP support and knowledge platforms aligned with the UAE Framework and GST1. However, Parties have repeatedly deferred reviewing its performance and COP–CMA governance arrangements since 2022. Its growing and frequently changing mandates also spread its limited capacity across multiple workstreams, while evidence of country-level uptake and results remains limited. The AC remains relevant and productive, but its implementation contribution falls short of its potential.
Climate Technology Center and Network (CTCN)	2010	14/CP.18 / 25/CP.19 10/CP.26	Art. 10		Report 2025, Workplan 2023–2027	Although its mandate and reports indicate that it facilitates the technical assistance foreseen in the Paris Agreement and its Article 10, no verifiable evidence shows its direct implementation in countries or how emissions have been reduced through technological mechanisms. In previous reports, the group noted the need for indicators that address the Paris Agreement's technology recommendations. The CTCN itself states: "The current monitoring and evaluation system does not allow for the assessment of its impact on transformational change envisioned in the Paris Agreement due to limited data reliability and methodological difficulties."
Technology Executive Committee (TEC)	2010	Mandate/ToR: 1/CP.16 4/CP.17	Art. 10		Report 2025, Workplan	Its role has focused primarily on technology analysis products and dialogue; however, its actions on implementing the Paris Agreement have been limited, as its own reports acknowledge constraints that prevent countries from effectively using the products it develops—and note that Parties are often unaware of the TEC's activities. At the same time, concrete evidence of how it has supported countries in implementing climate technologies, or how this has contributed to emission reductions, is lacking, given that its indicators and metrics track only the number of views or citations per published document. Nevertheless, its recent work plan includes new elements describing how it will incorporate the Global Stocktake (GST) recommendations, including synergies with financial and energy transition mechanisms.
Standing Committee on Finance (SCF)	2011	Decisions 1/CP.16 , 2/CP.17	Art. 2.1c and Art. 9		Report 2025	The strongest suit of the SCF responds to one of its functions for measurement, reporting and verification of support provided to developing countries, through its flagship reports on the Biennial Assessment of overall financial flows and the 100 bn climate finance goal, and it shows some progress in striving to improve coherence and coordination in the delivery of climate finance with its guidance to the operational entities of the financial mechanism. However, the Committee does not mobilize financial resources or rationalize the financial mechanism, which could support delivery of the NCQG financial targets (300 billion and 1.3 trillion) both externally and through multilateral climate funds. The seventh review of the financial mechanism has not been done since 2021.



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Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts (WIM ExCom)	2013	The WIM's functions and ExCom's guiding role are established in Decision 2/CP.19, paras. 5–9; its organization and procedures in Decision 2/CP.20	Art. 8		Report 2025, Rolling workplan	The WIM ExCom has a clear but broad mandate to guide work on averting, minimizing, and addressing loss and damage through knowledge, coordination, action, and support. However, WIM governance remains unresolved, and the establishment of the Santiago Network and the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage has created a more complex architecture with insufficiently defined interfaces. The Santiago Network is part of the WIM but operates under its own Advisory Board, while the Fund is institutionally separate and governed by its own Board. The ExCom therefore remains responsible for guiding the WIM's functions but has no authority over the technical assistance and financing channels central to implementation. Its 2023–2027 workplan predates GST1 and has not been systematically updated to reflect its outcomes. Despite extensive technical, communication and outreach products, evidence of uptake and country-level implementation remains limited. Clearer institutional roles and stronger pathways from ExCom knowledge and recommendations to technical assistance, finance and action are needed.
Paris Agreement Implementation and Compliance Committee (PAICC)	2015	Art. 15 of the PA; Decisions 20/CMA.1	Art. 15		Report 2025	The PAICC responds to its mandates and identifies needs and obstacles to implementing the PA. It still needs to engage systemically with other parts of the regime and constituted bodies to make sure these needs and obstacles are overcome.
Article 6.4 Supervisory Body	2015	Article 6.4 of the PA; Decisions 3/CMA.3 ; and 7/CMA.4	Art. 6.4		Report 2026, Workplan 2026	This SB has diligently worked on setting up the rules for executing Art. 6.4; however, there is no clarity on how it feeds into overall mitigation delivery of Art. 6 to the system, provided that there is no constituted body in charge of dealing with mitigation nor a specific entity that looks out for a systemic approach, either in relation to the work of the entirety of Article 6 or mitigation in general, and the MWP has failed to provide that overview.
Paris Committee on Capacity Building (PCCB)	2015		Art. 11		Report 2025	The PCCB has undertaken activities to achieve its objectives, such as the Durban Forum on Capacity-Building, the NDC Clinic, and the NAP Expo. However, there is little to no evidence of how Parties have incorporated the outcomes or dialogues from these events, or how they have directly benefited from them. Furthermore, reports highlight limited access to finance, inadequate data systems, poor institutional coordination, and language barriers that countries continue to face in their efforts to enhance capacity-building.
Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform (LCIPP)	2017		Preamble		Workplan (2025–2027)	The LCIPP has organized meetings and dialogues to fulfill its mandate, incorporate its perspectives, knowledge, and proposals into the implementation of the Paris Agreement, and generate synergies with other bodies and actors within the climate regime. For example, it has collaborated with 11 of the 16 established UNFCCC bodies, as well as external organizations, UN agencies, the IPCC, and financial institutions. However, the climate regime's functioning and the Parties' interests have limited, and in some cases prevented, its outputs from being directly reflected in decisions or policies. Likewise, the Platform's reports identify significant challenges to incorporating or operationalizing its activities, including language barriers, Indigenous



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						representation, and funding, as well as the need to standardize concepts of Indigenous Peoples and local communities. They also indicate that policymakers more often consult its outputs than use them to directly influence the design and implementation of climate policies.
Katowice Committee of Experts on the Impacts of the Implementation of Response Measures (KCI)	2018	Decisions 7/CP.24, 7/CMA.1 and 3/CMP.14	Preamble, Art. 4.15		Report 2025	The KCI has a clear and increasingly relevant mandate to assess the economic, social and cross-border impacts of climate policies. Its work is explicitly aligned with Article 4.15 and GST1, but its broad 2026–2030 workplan overlaps with the JTWP, MWP, GST and transparency processes. Unresolved concerns about distributional impacts frequently spill into other negotiations and complicate agreement on mitigation ambition and implementation. This is not attributable to the KCI alone: it produces technical analysis, while Parties negotiate outcomes through the Response Measures Forum. However, continued studies and dialogue have not yet translated into solutions to the main political and implementation bottlenecks. The KCI should focus on actionable options that help resolve these barriers and prevent the same unresolved issues from repeatedly constraining progress across the wider process.
Santiago Network		12/CMA.4 & 6/CMA.5	Art 8		Report 2026	The Santiago Network has a clear, relevant mandate within the Article 8 architecture, but its operational record remains nascent. Its alignment with GST1 is explicit, and its technical assistance can enable implementation by strengthening national systems, evidence and access to finance. However, the lengthy operationalization process, voluntary funding base, limited completed assistance and still-developing results framework constrain an assessment of effectiveness. Its institutional design is broadly coherent, but stronger interfaces are needed between the WIM ExCom's policy and knowledge functions, the Network's technical assistance and FRLD financing. Its potential significance is high; its demonstrated contribution to implementation is currently moderate.

Parameters

Operation	Is there clarity regarding the body's mandate, purpose, and functions?	It has clearly defined and current mandates and/or functions, as well as clearly established rules of procedure.	
		The mandate is partially clear and fragmented or outdated, yet its function and operation may still be identified.	



Parameters			
		The mandate and/or functions are ambiguous, obsolete, or lack a connection between the two (mandate and functions).	
Implementation	Is the mandate or the work of this constituted body enunciated in the Paris Agreement ?	The mandate or the work of this constituted body is enunciated in the PA.	
		The mandate or the work of this constituted body is not enunciated in the PA.	
	Does it have a direct link to the GST sectoral goals?	Sectoral goals have been incorporated into the body's work, its mandate, and/or its results.	
		There is a thematic link to the GST, but it is unclear whether it is truly integrated into the body's work	
		There is no reference to the GST or its outcomes in the work of the body and/or its mandate.	
	Do the body's work and results align with the implementation of the Paris Agreement?	The body's mandate and/or functions have an ongoing link to the PA, and its work makes a direct contribution to its implementation.	
		There's a link to the PA, but it is indirect or partial, and/or the contribution of its functions to implementation has not been sufficiently demonstrated.	
		There is no current link to the PA, and/or their work does not represent a demonstrable contribution to its implementation.	