



# FORESTS OF LATIN AMERICA

**Civil Society Contributions to the Roadmap  
to Halt and Reverse Deforestation and  
Forest Degradation by 2030 and 2050**

Climate Civil Society  
Organizations from Latin  
America and the Caribbean

June 2026

***“We care for our territory because the forest is the shade of all of us.”***

*-Chepito Mopayu. Nukak Indigenous Person*

## Introduction

This contribution from Latin American civil society organizations aims to inform the global Roadmap to Halt and Reverse Forest Deforestation and Degradation by 2030, from an implementation perspective and with a regional identity. It proposes priorities and actionable targets, anchored in Latin America's own challenges, that countries can adopt, backed by regional, bilateral, and multilateral partnerships, and integrated into existing instruments to accelerate results before 2030.

The document is based on [research](#) grounded in a desk review, analysis of existing instruments, and more than 21 interviews with Latin American experts on forests, climate, biodiversity, finance, trade, territorial rights, and governance. This technical basis was complemented by a regional process of discussion and collective construction with more than 20 civil society organizations and specialists from Latin America, including an [in-person gathering in Santa Marta](#), where priorities, targets, and enabling conditions for the Roadmap were reviewed. The process was oriented toward answering a practical question: what must happen for the global mandate to halt and reverse deforestation and degradation to stop being a general aspiration and become an operational agenda - with targets, instruments, identified gaps, solutions, and means of implementation?

The collective proposal presented below translates the global discussion into an operational structure capable of answering four questions for Latin America: What **targets** must be achieved? What **instruments** already exist to move forward? What **gaps** prevent their fulfillment? And what **solutions** must be activated? This proposal is a concrete structure for the global Roadmap to function as a tool for direction and acceleration at the regional level. Direction, because it helps order priorities. Acceleration, because it proposes action pathways that can be embedded in existing instruments and processes.

This proposal aligns with [Brazil's action-oriented Roadmap](#): it identifies critical barriers, existing means of implementation, scalable solutions, persistent gaps, and experiences that can be scaled or adapted to different contexts. The research underpinning this contribution provides the regional diagnosis to respond to the proposed themes -deforestation, degradation, restoration, sustainable management, bioeconomy, conservation, indigenous peoples, local communities, international cooperation, finance, value chains, trade, and environmental crime -and to organize them into targets, enabling conditions, and implementation pathways. In this line, this proposal turns the diagnosis into operational targets, building on the structural considerations raised by the Presidency. From that foundation, the signatory organizations seek to position Latin America as a region that enters this process with concrete priorities and implementation proposals, understanding the Forest Roadmap as part of the implementation acceleration machinery, alongside the Global Implementation Accelerator, the Action

Agenda, Mission 1.5, the Roadmap for the transition away from fossil fuels, and the Baku-to-Belém Finance Roadmap toward USD 1.3 trillion.

## Latin America Is Central to Global Forest Action

Latin America holds a unique weight in the global discussion on forests. It hosts 23% of the world's forests over 47% of its land surface, with ecosystems fundamental to mitigation, adaptation, biodiversity, water security, soil protection, livelihoods, and economies linked to land use and the production of primary commodities (FAO, 2021; Ruiz-Guevara, 2024; CAF, 2023; CEPAL, 2021). This centrality coincides with advances that demonstrate the regional capacity to change trajectories: domestic reforms that have reduced deforestation in countries such as Brazil and Colombia; expansion of forest concessions with traceability in Brazil; results-based forest finance in Chile; and early warning systems against illegal logging in Mexico.

Despite these examples of progress, Latin America's overall trajectory still falls short of global forest protection goals. South America had the world's highest net annual forest loss from 2015–2025 at 4.1 million hectares per year, with less than 30% of its forests under long-term management plans (United Nations, 2026). It accounted for 71% of global primary tropical forest loss in 2024; 75% of soils are degraded; and agriculture, forestry, and land use contribute 42% of regional greenhouse gas emissions (Monsalve, 2025; FAO, 2024; D. Aulestia y B. Lana, 2024; PNUD, 2025).

Addressing the challenges of Latin American forests requires a comprehensive, complex approach, as they are not solely due to failures in environmental policy. Rather, they relate to decisions about development, production, trade, finance, environmental crime, and territorial governance. The region contributes 14% of global food production and 45% of global net agrifood trade (Naciones Unidas, 2021). Moreover, from 2013 to 2019, it is estimated that 88% of deforestation associated with primary agricultural commodities occurred under conditions of illegality, and approximately 24% of those commodities were exported and imported (Forest Trends, 2021). In several biomes, forest loss and degradation are also intertwined with illegal mining, drug trafficking, land grabbing, wildlife trafficking, illegal logging, money laundering, and other criminal economies and activities that contest territorial control (Global Witness, 2025; RAISG, 2024).

The financial dimension reinforces the urgency of a solutions-oriented roadmap. Latin America and the Caribbean received approximately 26% of international public financing for forests in 2023, but globally, flows directed to activities with high influence over deforestation reach USD 8.9 trillion, while potentially harmful agricultural subsidies amount to approximately USD 406 billion (Forest Trends, 2021; UNEP, 2025). The problem is not only that forest resources are insufficient, but also that economic, financial, and commercial incentives continue to favor their loss.

Conflict also directly affects those who inhabit and defend territories. In 2024, Latin America concentrated more than 80% of the killings and disappearances of land and environmental defenders recorded globally (Global Witness, 2025). At the same time, the

territories of Indigenous Peoples, traditional communities, and Afro-descendant peoples are central to forest protection: Indigenous Peoples occupy 404 million hectares in Latin America, more than 80% covered by forests, and their territories have recorded lower levels of deforestation than areas without their presence; between 2000 and 2016, forest cover in indigenous lands declined by 4.9%, compared to 11.2% in areas without indigenous presence (FAO, 2025). These data show why the agenda on rights, land tenure, Indigenous Peoples in Isolation and Initial Contact (PIACI), direct financing, and the protection of defenders cannot be treated as a social complement, but rather as a condition for effectiveness.

## An Actionable Roadmap: Latin America's Proposal

The global Roadmap can add value if it helps countries and relevant actors move from scattered commitments to implementation measures. Countries in the region already have NDCs, NBSAPs, deforestation control strategies, forest plans, restoration targets, land-use planning instruments, voluntary Land Degradation Neutrality (LDN) targets, monitoring systems, regional platforms, financial mechanisms, and environmental democracy frameworks, such as the Escazú Agreement. The problem is the limited capacity of this suite of instruments to operate in an integrated manner against the real drivers of forest loss: productive pressure, opaque forest and agricultural value chains, misaligned financing, illegal economies, territorial insecurity, and rights without guarantees or compliance frameworks.

For this reason, this proposal operates on two levels: as a **Latin American contribution to the global Roadmap**, and as a **practical guide for countries in the region to translate that mandate into their own implementation agendas**. Likewise, it recognizes the wide interest expressed by the approximately 170 contributions submitted to the COP30 Presidency process for the Forest Roadmap and builds especially on contributions from Latin American and allied organizations<sup>1</sup>, identifying areas of convergence that can strengthen a collective proposal from the region.

We propose that countries identify the most relevant targets for their context and translate them into milestones, responsible parties, available resources, indicators, and cooperation needs. These targets should be incorporated into national and regional instruments on forests, aiming to minimize additional burdens and prioritizing a complementary approach that recognizes existing progress.

From this logic, the global Roadmap should generate incentives, recognition, and support for this exercise: helping existing instruments to organize around verifiable

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<sup>1</sup> Including contributions presented by [WWF](#), [CAN-LA/Transforma/ICPH LATAM](#), [Plataforma CIPÓ together with RAISG and ISA](#), [Greenpeace International together with climate justice organizations](#), [Dejusticia](#), indigenous organizations (i.e., Submission by [OPIAC to contribute to the COP30 Presidency roadmaps](#), [Political Declaration of the Indigenous Peoples of the Amazon Basin and all Biomes of Brazil for COP30](#), and the [Position of the Indigenous Peoples of the Amazon in relation to the V Presidential Summit of ACTO](#)), and other actors from the Global South.

results, facilitating regional, bilateral, and multilateral partnerships, and mobilizing technical and financial support for critical priorities toward 2030.

## Structure of the Latin American Proposal

We prioritize three implementation axes and five cross-cutting enabling conditions.

The **three implementation axes** are:

- 1.** Indigenous Peoples, Indigenous Peoples in Voluntary Isolation and Initial Contact (PIACI); Afro-descendant peoples; tribal peoples; peasant and rural communities; and traditional and local communities with a direct link to forests.
- 2.** Deforestation and conversion-free supply chains.
- 3.** Finance for forests and financial flows alignment.

These axes concentrate urgent transformations for the region. They do not exhaust the forest agenda or regional needs, but they do point to where Latin American civil society recommends focusing to accelerate implementation and ensure compliance with targets by 2030. These are areas where commitments, instruments, and experiences exist, but where structural gaps have also limited the impact of previous efforts: incomplete territorial rights, opaque supply chains, insufficient or misaligned financing, limited direct distribution of benefits, weak traceability, and a lack of conditions for those who sustain forests to participate and receive adequate support.

The **five cross-cutting enabling conditions** are:

- Monitoring, planning, and territorial response.
- Rights, territorial legitimacy, and implementation safeguards.
- Adaptation, Degradation, and Territorial Resilience.
- Synergies between just energy transition, energy development, and forests.
- Regional and global cooperation to scale implementation.




Figure 1. Diagram of the proposed operational structure.

## Roadmap Targets

The **6 targets** presented below constitute the central structure of this Latin American Roadmap. The targets aim to translate each implementation axis into an actionable proposal for 2030, accompanied by the enabling conditions needed to make it viable across different national and regional contexts.

These targets aim to serve as:

1. Input for Latin American countries to adopt or strengthen commitments in existing instruments.
2. Basis for regional, bilateral, and multilateral partnerships that enable the mobilization of technical and financial support.
3. Contribution to the global Roadmap process, activating implementation mechanisms around concrete targets.
4. Political signals to accelerate implementation toward 2030, allow progress to be more clearly evaluated, and ensure that progress on forests is recognized, evaluated, and strengthened within the follow-up processes of the Rio Conventions, including the pathway toward the second Global Stocktake.

This regional contribution proposes using the new political spotlight on forests to accelerate transformations that have been neglected or insufficiently implemented: territorial rights and PIACI; deforestation- and conversion-free supply chains; forest-aligned financing; planning and governance; environmental crime and territorial control; and a rights-based approach as a cross-cutting condition. This focus seeks to make the forest agenda more actionable and to connect it with decisions on development, finance, trade, territory, and rights. The aim is for Latin America to enter the global process with an implementation architecture capable of advancing commitments, cooperation, and verifiable results before 2030.

**Implementation Axis: Indigenous Peoples, Indigenous Peoples in Voluntary Isolation and Initial Contact (PIACI); Afro-descendant peoples; tribal peoples; peasant and rural communities; and traditional and local communities with a direct link to forests**

**Legal Protection of Land Tenure, Territorial Sovereignty, and Demarcation**

**No. 1.1**

**Target**






By 2030, States shall **legally protect** the territorial rights of Indigenous Peoples<sup>2</sup>, through the titling, delimitation, and demarcation of **at least 80% of indigenous and PIACI territories, and respectively, of the territories and lands of Afro-descendant peoples and traditional and tribal communities**, adopting the corresponding measures to protect, without delay, the property right of the respective people in their territory, including the official recognition of that right.

**Context:**





Indigenous Peoples occupy approximately one-fifth of the region's territory, and more than 80% of that area is covered by forests ([FAO, 2025](#)). Throughout history, they have been the ones who have most conserved and defended these territories. However, these same territories have been occupied, possessed, and used by third parties as a result of the expropriation of their livelihoods and the economic interests that dispossess and plunder them. Globally, only 8% of customary lands are formally recognized with documented property rights. Among Afro-descendant populations, in 15 countries (not including Brazil), more than 32.6 million hectares of rural land on which they are settled have been identified; however, only approximately 16% of these are claimed territories or are in the process of demarcation ([Proceso de Comunidades Negras, et al. 2024](#)).

<sup>2</sup> In accordance with the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Articles 26–29).

<b>Implementation Axis: Indigenous Peoples, Indigenous Peoples in Voluntary Isolation and Initial Contact (PIACI); Afro-descendant peoples; tribal peoples; peasant and rural communities; and traditional and local communities with a direct link to forests</b>		
<b>Legal Protection of Land Tenure, Territorial Sovereignty, and Demarcation</b>		<b>No. 1.1</b>
<b>Existing Instruments</b>	<b>Gaps</b>	
<p><b>Regulatory frameworks:</b> United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) through its standards on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples over their Ancestral Lands and Natural Resources; Amazon Cooperation Treaty; UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas; COP30 intergovernmental commitment on land tenure; and the Belém Declaration.</p> <p><b>Platforms/cooperation:</b> Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO), and its <a href="#">Amazonian Indigenous Peoples Mechanism (MAPI)</a>.</p> <p><b>Financial instruments:</b> REDD+, GCF, GEF, TFFF.</p> <p><b>Monitoring/data systems:</b> <a href="#">Global Forest Watch</a> internationally; <a href="#">Brazil's Rural Environmental Registry</a> and <a href="#">Forest Code</a>. Also noteworthy are the <a href="#">Observatory of Indigenous Peoples, Natural Resources, and the Environment (OPIRNA)</a>; and <a href="#">indigenous geographic information systems, such as the CNTI</a> Indigenous Geographic Information System in Colombia.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Commitments without operational translation.</li> <li>→ Non-existent, heterogeneous, or ambiguous definition of what demarcation, delimitation, and titling entail.</li> <li>→ Disregard for the jurisdiction and self-governance of Indigenous Peoples by States.</li> <li>→ Land tenure insecurity, lack of territorial designation, and pressure from legal and illegal extractive activities on territories that facilitate irregular occupation.</li> <li>→ Limited institutional capacities and insufficient financing.</li> </ul>	
<b>Solutions</b>		
 <b>National</b>	 <b>Regional</b>	 <b>Global</b>
<p>Clarify, recognize, guarantee, and safeguard the inherent, distinct, and internationally recognized rights of indigenous peoples, as established in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), without confusing, diluting, or equating them with those of other categories or groups.</p>	<p>Coordinate regionally to harmonize tenure standards in cross-border territories, as well as to exchange lessons learned and best practices.</p>	<p>Move to implementation and binding actions at all levels of government and in coordination with other actors (international</p>

<b>Implementation Axis: Indigenous Peoples, Indigenous Peoples in Voluntary Isolation and Initial Contact (PIACI); Afro-descendant peoples; tribal peoples; peasant and rural communities; and traditional and local communities with a direct link to forests</b>		
<b>Legal Protection of Land Tenure, Territorial Sovereignty, and Demarcation</b>		<b>No. 1.1</b>
Establish, from States and in collaboration with peoples, a proper conceptualization of what formal titling, tenure with sovereignty, delimitation, and demarcation of Indigenous Peoples and their territories entail.		organizations, companies, NGOs, and CSOs).
Consolidate legal protection of land tenure alongside territorial sovereignty and autonomy.		
Delimit and plan exact demarcations of land and territorial use in participation with people, with defined oversight, regulations, and budgets.		
Prioritize land tenure as the most effective instrument for halting deforestation -in coordination with environmental criteria, monitoring systems, and comprehensive territorial planning- as well as a key instrument for ensuring carbon permanence and the integrity of carbon sinks.		
Adopt existing instruments with legal and budgetary backing.		

<p><b>Implementation Axis: Indigenous Peoples, Indigenous Peoples in Voluntary Isolation and Initial Contact (PIACI); Afro-descendant peoples; tribal peoples; peasant and rural communities; and traditional and local communities with a direct link to forests</b></p>	
<p><b>Recognition and Protection of Indigenous Peoples in Voluntary Isolation and Initial Contact (PIACI)</b> <span style="float: right;"><b>No. 1.2</b></span></p>	
<p><b>Target</b></p>	
<div style="display: flex; align-items: flex-start;"> <div style="margin-right: 20px;">  <p>2030</p> </div> <div> <p><b>Ensure the full recognition and territorial protection of PIACI</b>, as well as the absolute prohibition of any form of external interference (intangibility zones). In addition, specific protection and containment measures are further recommended for so-called buffer zones (lands surrounding or located near PIACI territories) and coordination with neighboring communities for monitoring and protection.</p> </div> </div>	
<p><b>Context:</b></p>	
<div style="display: flex; align-items: flex-start;"> <div style="margin-right: 20px;">  <p>189 records of Indigenous Peoples in Isolation</p> <p>68% Without legal recognition</p> </div> <div> <p>Latin America -and specifically the Amazon biome- is home to the largest number of PIACI in the world, yet serious legal vulnerabilities and safeguard weaknesses exist regarding their territorial rights and protection.. In South America, for example, it is estimated that of the <a href="#">189</a> records of Indigenous Peoples in Isolation, 128 have no legal recognition (<a href="#">Indigenous Peoples of the Amazon Basin and all Biomes of Brazil, 2025</a>).</p> </div> </div>	
<p><b>Existing Instruments</b></p>	<p><b>Gaps</b></p>
<p><b>Regulatory frameworks:</b> UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; Amazon Cooperation Treaty; Guidelines for the Protection of Indigenous Peoples in Voluntary Isolation and Initial Contact in the Amazon Region, the Gran Chaco, and the Eastern Region of Paraguay; IACHR Recommendations for Indigenous Peoples in Voluntary Isolation and Initial Contact in the Americas; Belém Declaration; ACTO Principles and Guidelines for Health Care</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➔ Absence of delimitation and demarcation of territories inhabited by PIACI.</li> <li>➔ Weak interregional coordination to delimit PIACI territories that cross state borders.</li> <li>➔ Regulatory gaps in recognizing PIACI's existence, as well as insufficient strategic information about their characteristics and needs.</li> </ul>

<b>Implementation Axis: Indigenous Peoples, Indigenous Peoples in Voluntary Isolation and Initial Contact (PIACI); Afro-descendant peoples; tribal peoples; peasant and rural communities; and traditional and local communities with a direct link to forests</b>		
<b>Recognition and Protection of Indigenous Peoples in Voluntary Isolation and Initial Contact (PIACI)</b>		<b>No. 1.2</b>
<p>for Isolated and Initially Contacted Indigenous Peoples; ACTO Strategic Framework for the Protection of PIACI.</p> <p><b>Platforms/cooperation:</b> ACTO and its <a href="#">Amazonian Indigenous Peoples Mechanism (MAPI)</a>; <a href="#">Indigenous Geographic Information System</a>; <a href="#">Tapiche Indigenous Reserve, Yavari, Peru</a>.</p> <p><b>Financial instruments:</b> Inter-American Development Bank through the PIACI Regional Strategic Protection Framework; opportunities for synergies with REDD+ mechanisms.</p> <p><b>Monitoring/data systems:</b> Satellite imagery; community surveillance; <a href="#">Global Forest Watch</a>; GTI <a href="#">PIACI.I</a>; IACHR Judgment: <a href="#">Tagaeri and Taromenani vs. Ecuador</a>.</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Extreme vulnerability to criminal activities, including the murder of their members and the risk of the disappearance of entire peoples.</li> <li>→ Land tenure insecurity, lack of territorial designation, and pressure from legal and illegal extractive activities toward territories that facilitate irregular occupation.</li> <li>→ Lack of effective compliance with the principles of no-contact, precaution, and intangibility.</li> </ul>
<b>Solutions</b>		
 <b>National</b>	 <b>Regional</b>	 <b>Global</b>
<p>Monitoring, recognition, and knowledge of the PIACI present in the territory.</p> <p>Adoption in existing instruments with legal and budgetary backing, as well as recognition of territories for their protection.</p> <p>Develop communication and participation mechanisms appropriate to their culture and language for people in initial contact, guaranteeing FPIC and strengthening their capacities to design and apply their own protocols.</p>	<p>Regional coordination for protection, monitoring, and tenure of PIACI settled in cross-border territories.</p>	<p>Implement international frameworks such as the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as applied to PIACI.</p>

<b>Implementation Axis: Indigenous Peoples, Indigenous Peoples in Voluntary Isolation and Initial Contact (PIACI); Afro-descendant peoples; tribal peoples; peasant and rural communities; and traditional and local communities with a direct link to forests</b>		
<b>Recognition and Protection of Indigenous Peoples in Voluntary Isolation and Initial Contact (PIACI)</b>		<b>No. 1.2</b>
Strictly apply the principles of no-contact and intangibility for peoples in voluntary isolation, prohibiting and preventing entry into their territories and avoiding any form of external contact.		
Strengthen and effectively manage buffer zones as protective barriers around PIACI territories.		
Establish integrated monitoring and early-warning systems against threats through inter-institutional and cross-border coordination for the protection, recognition, and understanding of existing PIACI territories.		
Guarantee the full recognition and rights of PIACI, through both national legislation and regional and international legal instruments such as the Escazú Agreement.		

**Implementation Axis: Deforestation and Conversion-Free Supply Chains**

**Incorporation of Binding Zero-Deforestation Commitments in Key Primary Commodity Supply Chains by 2030**

No. 2.1


**Target**



By 2030, ensure that 100% of agroforestry sectors, in particular timber, soy, beef, sugar, coffee, palm oil, as well as large-scale mining and hydrocarbon incorporate the **zero-deforestation principle throughout the value chain** (production, trade, and markets), backed by binding frameworks with clear consequences for non-compliance.

**Context:**

Forest loss in Latin America between 2001 and 2019



Cattle ranching and soy production accounted for 77% of forest loss in Latin America between 2001 and 2019. Eighty-eight percent of deforestation associated with primary agricultural commodities occurred under conditions of illegality, and approximately 24% of those commodities were exported (Ritchie, 2021; Forest Trends, 2021). Voluntary corporate commitments, such as the 2014 New York Declaration on Forests, have had limited impact due to the absence of state monitoring systems and binding frameworks with clear consequences for non-compliance (Global Canopy, 2025; Global Canopy, 2026; Global Witness, 2022; Lyons-White et al., 2020).

**Existing Instruments**

**Regulatory frameworks:** Trade agreements between countries, e.g., [Mercosur-EU Agreement](#); [EUDR](#) (EU Deforestation Regulation); UK [Environment Act](#); [Lacey Act](#) (United States); [FOREST Act](#) (US, proposed in Senate); sectoral standards and regulatory measures linked to agricultural, logging, and mining supply chains in Mexico; Cattle Traceability Law in Colombia; Brazil's [Forest Code](#); [EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence](#)

**Gaps**

➔ Although initiatives such as Brazil's soy moratorium have been successful in reducing deforestation through voluntary corporate commitments, globally, such initiatives have been difficult to sustain over time or have had limited impact. In countries of the region, progress is needed on binding environmental and [human rights due diligence frameworks](#) (with specific considerations for zero-deforestation value chains) with clear consequences for non-compliance (Global Canopy, 2025; Global Canopy, 2026; Global

### Implementation Axis: Deforestation and Conversion-Free Supply Chains

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No. 2.1

**Directive:** [Escazú Agreement](#); [UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights](#).




**Platforms/cooperation:** [Tropical Forest Alliance](#) (TFA); [Forest 500](#); [TRASE](#); [FCLP](#); [Consumer Goods Forum](#); [Bonn Challenge](#); [New York Declaration on Forests](#); [Team Europe Initiative on Deforestation-free Value Chains](#); [Forest Declaration Assessment](#); [Glasgow Leaders' Declaration on Forests and Land](#); [Accountability Framework Initiative](#) (AFI); [First Movers Coalition for Food](#);

**Financial instruments:** Certification of deforestation-free value chains (e.g., [Rainforest Alliance](#), [Forest Stewardship Council](#)); use of disclosure frameworks to identify investments in high-deforestation-risk supply chains; resolutions from monetary authorities, such as [Brazil's National Monetary Council, on social, environmental, and climate impediments to credit issuance](#).

**Monitoring/data systems:** [Global Forest Watch](#) (WRI); [MapBiomass](#), [Terra-i](#) (CIAT / CGIAR); [Forest & Finance](#); [SPOTT](#) (ZSL); [Environmental Justice Atlas](#); [Restor](#).

[Witness](#), 2022; [Lyons-White et al.](#), 2020; [Danish Institute for Human Rights](#), 2025).

- Even if binding frameworks were implemented at the national and international level, countries in the region need robust monitoring and verification systems. To make supply chains transparent and traceable, particularly at intermediate and subnational levels, where high levels of opacity and informality persist alongside significant risk of laundering products linked to deforestation and conversion ([Zu Ermgassen et al.](#), 2022; [Cammelli et al.](#), 2022; [Environmental Investigation Agency](#), 2021; [Forest Trends](#), 2021).
- Structural barriers to territorial and forest governance exist in several countries, preventing the on-the-ground application of control mechanisms, especially in territories with high informality, tenure conflicts, the presence of illicit economies, or limited state capacity ([Hurtado, 2025](#); [Ebus, 2025](#); [Sumaúma, 2025](#); [Dejusticia, 2024](#); [Miranda, 2024](#); [InSight Crime, 2022](#); [Villalba et al.](#), 2026).
- There are barriers to the access and active disclosure of information related to supply chains, preventing state control and citizen oversight for forest protection, including limitations in interoperability, access to public data, traceability, and corporate transparency ([Zu Ermgassen et al.](#), 2022; [Lyons-White et al.](#), 2020; [Global Canopy, 2025](#); [Fripp et al.](#), 2023).
- A gap exists between supply chain control instruments and safeguards for economic reconversion and human rights for a just transition that protects smallholder farmers, Indigenous Peoples, local communities, and other vulnerable actors linked to these supply chains ([Schilling-Vacaflor & Gustafsson, 2024](#); [Zhunusova et al.](#), 2022; [SEI](#), 2024).

<b>Implementation Axis: Deforestation and Conversion-Free Supply Chains</b>		
<b>Incorporation of Binding Zero-Deforestation Commitments in Key Primary Commodity Supply Chains by 2030</b>		<b>No. 2.1</b>
<b>Solutions</b>		
 <b>National</b>	 <b>Regional</b>	 <b>Global</b>
<p>Strengthen national legal frameworks linked to environmental impact assessments in Latin American countries in order to incorporate standards for controlling deforestation, land-use change, and emissions from agrifood, forestry, mining, energy, and infrastructure activities. Strengthen environmental provisions in international trade treaties.</p>	<p>Regional cooperation for framework interoperability, financing, capacities, and monitoring and verification systems.</p>	<p>Coordination and cooperation for the implementation of binding human rights and environmental due diligence frameworks, with specific clauses related to commitments to halt and reverse deforestation and degradation. This includes Global North countries providing technical and financial support so that Global South countries, including those in the region, have the capacity to implement these frameworks without undermining their right to development and without negatively impacting small producers and farmers. Revision of free trade agreements of the Global North countries to incorporate negative deforestation impact clauses. Reduction of Global North country demand through a regional cooperation mechanism for EUDR implementation, traceability, and deforestation-free supply chain standards.</p>
<p>Introduce and implement national legislation on human rights and environmental due diligence. This should incorporate Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) as a mandatory criterion in due diligence processes, as well as zero-deforestation clauses with clear consequences for non-compliance and transparency requirements (<a href="#">Global Canopy</a>, 2026, <a href="#">Danish Human Rights Institute</a>, 2025).</p>		
<p>Incorporate incentives such as Sustainable Public Procurement with strict zero-deforestation criteria and promotion of restoration of degraded lands (<a href="#">IISD</a>, 2020).</p>		
<p>Strengthen national and regional supply chain monitoring and verification systems with the capacity to trace all levels of the supply chain, including intermediaries, and promote cooperation</p>		

**Implementation Axis: Deforestation and Conversion-Free Supply Chains**

**Incorporation of Binding Zero-Deforestation Commitments in Key Primary Commodity Supply Chains by 2030**

No. 2.1

in information management and institutional strengthening. Enhance transparency of information and ensure citizen access in accordance with the Escazú Agreement ([Zu Ermgassen et al., 2022](#); [Forest Trends, 2021](#))

**Implementation Axis: Finance for forests and financial flows alignment**

**Mobilization of ~USD 216 Billion in Additional Annual Financing for Forests by 2030**


No. 3.1

**Target**



Mobilize approximately **USD 216 billion** in additional annual financing for forests, directed toward conservation, restoration, bioeconomy, sustainable productive supply chains, and strengthening of enabling conditions, through a combination of public, private, concessional, and innovative financing by 2030.

**Context:**






Global financing for forests reached USD 84 billion in 2023, but it should triple to USD 300 billion per year by 2030 to meet climate, biodiversity, and land degradation targets under the Rio Conventions, leaving a gap of USD 216 billion per year ([UNEP, 2025](#)).

Approximately 96% of the recorded financing came from domestic public spending, revealing the limited contribution of international public mobilization ([UNEP, 2025](#)). The private sector, in turn, contributed in 2023 less than 1 dollar for every 10 dollars of forest financing ([UNEP, 2025](#)).

<b>Implementation Axis: Finance for forests and financial flows alignment</b>	
<b>Mobilization of ~USD 216 Billion in Additional Annual Financing for Forests by 2030</b>	
<b>No. 3.1</b>	
<b>Existing Instruments</b>	<b>Gaps</b>
<p><b>Regulatory frameworks:</b> <a href="#">ICJ Advisory Opinion on climate change</a>; <a href="#">UN General Assembly Resolution on the ICJ Advisory Opinion on Climate Change</a>; <a href="#">Paris Agreement</a>.</p> <p><b>Platforms/cooperation:</b> <a href="#">UN Forum on Forests</a>; FCLP; Multilateral banking platforms; Regional platform of Latin American finance/economy/treasury ministers; <a href="#">BIOFIN</a>; <a href="#">TNFD</a>; public-private partnerships; REDLAC.</p> <p><b>Financial instruments:</b> (i) Obligation of developed countries to provide developing countries with means of implementation, including the provision of financing. (ii) Use of instruments and mechanisms such as debt-for-nature swaps; TFFF; jurisdictional REDD+; thematic bonds; biodiversity credits; carbon markets; Payment for Environmental Services; Water Funds.</p> <p><b>Monitoring/Data Systems:</b> Reporting Frameworks (Data to Guide Investment Decisions).</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Lack of precise data to quantify forest financing needs and flows specifically for Latin America, and therefore no way to quantify the regional forest financing gap (Own research conclusion).</li> <li>→ The provision of both international public financing and private sector financing for forests is very limited, equivalent to less than 10% of the forest financial flows recorded in 2023 (<a href="#">UNEP</a>, 2025).</li> <li>→ Regional forest financing tends to concentrate in the Amazon region, with a carbon-centric focus that tends to sideline the dimensions of conservation and restoration (<a href="#">Qin et al.</a>, 2024).</li> <li>→ The combined effect of instruments such as JREDD+, redirection of high-deforestation-risk investments, the TFFF, sovereign debt management, and fiscal incentives for the private sector mobilizes only 22% of the global gap (<a href="#">FCLP</a>, 2025).</li> <li>→ Lack of integration with regional initiatives and networks; non-binding spaces; political turnover; and disconnect between finance and forests.</li> </ul>
<b>Gaps and solutions at the level of instruments and mechanisms</b>	
<b>Gaps</b>	<b>Solutions</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ <b>TFFF:</b> Mobilization of the initial public tranche (junior tranche, 20%); risk from financial shocks in emerging markets; governance of the at least 20% allocated to Indigenous Peoples yet to be defined; ambiguous criteria on what is paid for (20% forest canopy cover threshold) (<a href="#">FCLP</a>, 2025; <a href="#">Rodriguez</a>, 2026; <a href="#">Global Witness</a>, 2025; <a href="#">Fern</a>, 2025; <a href="#">Pearce</a>, 2025; <a href="#">Plant-for-the-planet</a>, 2025; <a href="#">Global Forest Coalition et al.</a>, 2025; <a href="#">Human Rights Watch</a>, 2026).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ <b>TFFF:</b> Mobilize the initial public tranche (junior tranche of 20%) to attract the remaining USD 100 billion in senior private deb (a process estimated to last two to three years with first disbursements toward 2028–2029); stipulate governance processes for the at least 20% allocated to Indigenous Peoples during the first two years, including a baseline and guidelines regarding FPIC's role in structuring these processes, under risk of sanction; strengthen scientific criteria on what</li> </ul>

<b>Implementation Axis: Finance for forests and financial flows alignment</b>	
<b>Mobilization of ~USD 216 Billion in Additional Annual Financing for Forests by 2030</b>	<b>No. 3.1</b>
	is paid for, including raising the current 20% forest canopy cover threshold.
<p>→ <b>Debt-for-nature swaps:</b> High transaction costs and negotiation complexity; insufficient scale for meaningful debt relief; risk of conditionalities; lack of transparency and civil society participation</p> <p>→ (<a href="#">Forest Declaration Assessment, 2024</a>; <a href="#">Chandrasekhar &amp; Quiroz, 2024</a>; <a href="#">Latindadd &amp; CDES, 2024</a>; <a href="#">Latindadd, 2023</a>).</p>	<p>→ <b>Debt-for-nature swaps (DNS):</b> Develop a regional framework for DNS design and execution that facilitates mutual understanding among countries, reduces transaction costs, and systematizes accumulated regional experience, guaranteeing, from the outset, the participation of civil society and Indigenous Peoples (<a href="#">UNEP, 2026</a>; <a href="#">Latindadd, 2023</a>). Complement this framework with debt-pooling mechanisms and a regional special-purpose fund channeling generated savings toward climate and conservation actions of cross-border scope, including the protection of shared forest ecosystems such as the Amazon (<a href="#">UNEP, 2026</a>). Ensure schemes where the scale of the swap is sufficiently significant to provide real debt relief, avoiding new loans at higher rates. Design mechanisms that allow greater transparency during negotiations and public documentation once swaps are agreed, enabling civil society's role vis-à-vis contract terms.</p>
<p>→ <b>Jurisdictional REDD+:</b> Unresolved tensions in benefit distribution; Indigenous Peoples and local communities must be co-designers and decision-makers, not merely beneficiaries (<a href="#">Forest Trends, 2025</a>; <a href="#">Mongabay, 2025</a>; <a href="#">RRI, 2021</a>).</p> <p>→ <b>Carbon markets (project-based approach):</b> Lack of guarantees regarding FPIC for Indigenous Peoples, Afro-descendant peoples, and local communities; limited progress on benefit distribution, governance, and reparation mechanisms; inadequate data infrastructure; unresolved traceability schemes; insufficient legal frameworks (<a href="#">RRI, 2021</a>; <a href="#">Banco Mundial, 2025</a>; <a href="#">Romm et al., 2025</a>; <a href="#">CMNUCC, 2025</a>).</p>	<p>→ <b>Jurisdictional REDD+, carbon markets, and biodiversity credits:</b> Strengthen MRV systems, establish robust safeguard frameworks, and standardize traceability schemes and methodologies to ensure reliable baselines. Expand, and where they do not exist, establish legal frameworks defining what carbon credits are, who owns them, who issues them, and how they are registered. Develop clear governance regulations for high-integrity markets, including fair benefit distribution frameworks and reparation mechanisms from a comprehensive human rights perspective. Advance indigenous land tenure, recognition of carbon rights, and FPIC guarantees in conformity with ILO Convention 169 and UNDRIP, as a precondition for effectively and fairly implementing market mechanisms (<a href="#">RRI, 2021</a>). Prioritize jurisdictional</p>

<b>Implementation Axis: Finance for forests and financial flows alignment</b>	
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<p>→ <b>Biodiversity credits:</b> Incipient development; unconsolidated corporate or public demand; fragmented global standards; similar gaps in human rights and traceability as in carbon markets (<a href="#">Forest Declaration Assessment</a>, 2024).</p>	<p>approaches (JREDD+) and ensure Indigenous Peoples and local communities are co-designers and decision-makers.</p>
<p>→ <b>Thematic bonds:</b> Unsuitable for countries with high debt levels; lack of financial capacity to absorb and manage initial financial flows, as well as to ensure long-term repayment; standards fragmentation resulting in greenwashing risk (<a href="#">Forest Declaration Assessment</a>, 2024; <a href="#">Bigger</a>, 2023; <a href="#">Huang &amp; Zhu</a>, 2026).</p>	<p>→ <b>Thematic bonds:</b> Prioritize thematic bonds in countries with sufficient fiscal space, avoiding them from becoming an additional debt burden. Develop national capacities to absorb and manage financial flows and ensure long-term repayment. Strengthen ESG disclosure regulatory frameworks and green taxonomies to reduce greenwashing risk and issuance costs (<a href="#">Huang &amp; Zhu</a>, 2026).</p>
<p>→ <b>Forest bioeconomy:</b> Structurally limited credit access; competition with low-rate credit from actors operating outside the law without environmental conditionalities (<a href="#">OCDE et al.</a>, 2025; <a href="#">ClimateShot Investor Coalition &amp; CPI</a>, 2025).</p>	<p>→ <b>Forest bioeconomy:</b> Strengthen non-timber forest product value chains, ecotourism, and regenerative agriculture as profitable alternatives to destructive forest use, prioritizing local and regional markets. Establish traceability schemes and methodologies for reliable baselines. Expand credit access for small producers through financial products adapted to agroforestry cycles with fair rates.</p>
<p>→ <b>Payment for Ecosystem Services:</b> Average five-year timeframe that is structurally insufficient for long-term forest impacts; dependence on national public financing with limited participation of international public financing and the private sector; absence of multidimensional monitoring to detect perverse incentives and demonstrate additionality; schemes implemented in indigenous territories can undermine their own conservation institutions and traditional practices when limited attention is paid to indigenous preferences in their design (<a href="#">Perevochtchikova et al.</a>, 2021; <a href="#">Lliso et al.</a>, 2020).</p>	<p>→ <b>Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES):</b> Redirect PES schemes toward long-term, interdisciplinary, and intersectoral collaborations. Implement comprehensive monitoring schemes that measure social, economic, and environmental outcomes. Diversify financing sources, incorporating international public financing and, complementarily, private capital for blended finance schemes. In cases where PES development occurs in or adjacent to Indigenous Peoples' territories, involve the people from design through implementation, seeking participation guarantees that include, but are not limited to, monetary benefits.</p>

<b>Implementation Axis: Finance for forests and financial flows alignment</b>		
<b>Mobilization of ~USD 216 Billion in Additional Annual Financing for Forests by 2030</b>		<b>No. 3.1</b>
<b>Solutions</b>		
 <b>National</b>	 <b>Regional</b>	 <b>Global</b>
<p>Develop capacities to absorb financial flows and ensure repayment; strengthen ESG frameworks and transparency standards; strengthen MRV systems, legal governance frameworks, carbon rights, land tenure, and FPIC, prioritizing jurisdictional approaches; use thematic bonds in countries with sufficient fiscal space; create competitive credit lines for forest bioeconomy; position forest bioeconomy as an economic alternative in each country.</p>	<p>Identify gaps and mobilization potential of forest financing in the region; enable the role of civil society and Indigenous Peoples in contract terms, advancing transparency mechanisms within a regional DNS framework; consolidate a regional DNS framework with civil society and Indigenous Peoples participation, complemented with debt pooling mechanisms and a regional special-purpose fund for cross-border ecosystems such as the Amazon.</p>	<p>Fulfill financing provision obligations in line with the Paris Agreement and the ICJ Advisory Opinion, on the part of developed countries toward developing countries.</p> <p>Provide at least USD 300 billion annually by 2035 in climate financing to developing countries, in conformity with the ICJ Advisory Opinion and the COP29 Global Finance Goal, covering the USD 216 billion annual gap for forests (Developed countries' commitment); Advocate in the TFFF operational manual to ensure robust social and environmental safeguards, guarantee disbursement processes to Indigenous Peoples that respect their self-determination, and secure civil society participation spaces in the Fund's governance (TFFF); Advocate for the adequate capitalization of the GBFF (Forest bioeconomy/general conservation and degradation).</p>

### Implementation Axis: Finance for forests and financial flows alignment

#### Redirecting Harmful Financial Flows for Forests


No. 3.2

#### Target



Redirect harmful public and private flows toward forest-compatible activities before 2030.

#### Context:



Financing directed to companies with strong influence over deforestation reached USD 8.9 trillion in November 2024, equivalent to more than one hundred times the total forest financing in 2023 (UNEP,2025). Potentially harmful agricultural subsidies amounted to approximately USD 406 billion in 2023 (UNEP,2025; Banco Mundial, 2023).

In 2024, the CDP identified USD 37 billion in deforestation-associated risks and USD 730 billion in transition opportunities. According to FCLP, investing 20% of the at-risk value and 20% of transition opportunities could mobilize up to USD 10 billion annually directed toward forest objectives.




#### Existing Instruments

**Regulatory frameworks:** Brazil's CVM [Resolution No. 59/2021](#); Chile's CMF General Rule No. 461/2021; Colombia's Superintendencia Financiera External Circular 031 of 2021; Costa Rica's SUGEVAL SGV-A-253-2021; Mexico's CNBV Emisoras de Valores 2021 Dispositions; Peru's SMV Resolution No. 018-2020; Argentina's CNV Resolution 896/2021; Colombia's Carbon Tax; Costa Rica's Carbon Tax.

#### Gaps

- Flows mobilized for forest conservation, restoration, and protection in 2023 are disproportionately lower than harmful financial flows for forests.
- The region currently registers multiple subsidies for high-deforestation-risk activities.

**Implementation Axis: Finance for forests and financial flows alignment**

Redirecting Harmful Financial Flows for Forests		No. 3.2
<p><b>Platforms/cooperation:</b> <a href="#">LACADI</a>; <a href="#">LAC Taxonomy Observatories</a>; <a href="#">UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation</a> (in development); Regional platform of Latin American finance/economy/treasury ministers.</p> <p><b>Financial instruments:</b> Reinvestment of funds identified through disclosure frameworks; Strengthening of public finances.</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ The region collects 21.3% of GDP in taxes, well below the OECD average of 33.9%, limiting the capacity to finance forest objectives from national public finances.</li> <li>→ Adoption of frameworks such as TNFD at the regional level is 68%, below the global average, and implementation is extremely costly for small and micro enterprises, which nevertheless need it to comply with international supply chain regulations.</li> <li>→ MDBs continue to finance sectors and entities linked to deforestation; monitoring of deforestation impacts is lacking; and the voluntary commitments they have made in this area have been insufficient (<a href="#">Bank Information Center, 2022</a>; <a href="#">Friends of the Earth, 2022</a>; <a href="#">Kaminski, 2023</a>).</li> </ul>
Solutions		
 National	 Regional	 Global
Advocate financial regulators (securities and banking superintendencies) to make disclosure frameworks (TNFD, ISSB...) mandatory for identifying deforestation-linked risks; channel financial resources so that small and micro enterprises can adopt these frameworks.		Redirect funds associated with high-deforestation-risk investments toward transition opportunities, including opportunities in the forest sector and zero-deforestation activities.
Identify and classify harmful agricultural subsidies, redesign them with forest conditionalities, and redirect resources toward sustainable agricultural credit models (Public finances).	Promote regional central banks' application of environmental stress tests to evaluate their portfolios' exposure to deforestation-linked assets, and incorporate deforestation-free criteria.	MDBs should suspend all investment or budgetary support that directly or indirectly fosters deforestation or has negative impacts on forest conservation and regeneration, including requirements for complete zero-deforestation

<b><u>Implementation Axis: Finance for forests and financial flows alignment</u></b>		
<b>Redirecting Harmful Financial Flows for Forests</b>		<b>No. 3.2</b>
		traceability in financed entities' supply chains with active monitoring by MDBs.
	Coordinate to improve the interoperability of the reporting framework (Corporate risks).	Advocate in the UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation for global fiscal reforms that tax extreme wealth and high emissions, with resources redirected to forest protection -including <a href="#">cap-and-share</a> systems and redistribution mechanisms within <a href="#">basic income frameworks for conservation</a> .
Implement fiscal instruments with forest-designated revenue (Public finances).	Increase regional and international coordination that actively seeks framework interoperability, providing space for comparable metrics.	

**Implementation Axis: Finance for forests and financial flows alignment**

**Guaranteed Access to Forest Financing for Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities**


**No. 3.3**

**Target**



By 2030, **100%** of multilateral development banks and climate funds must implement direct-access agreements for Indigenous Peoples and local communities.

**Context:**



**7% - USD 1,7 billion**  
directed to IP  
and local  
communities

Despite their central role in forest protection, it is estimated that of the total committed under COP26's Forest Finance Pledge, only 7% (USD 1.7 billion) was reported to have reached Indigenous Peoples and local communities directly, and less than 1% of Official Development Assistance for climate was directed to these groups between 2011 and 2020 ([Forest Declaration Assessment, 2024](#)).

**Existing Instruments**


**Regulatory frameworks:** [UNDRIP](#)

**Platforms/cooperation:** COICA and its indigenous organization structure; UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; Amazon Cooperation Treaty.

**Financial instruments:** Dedicated financing windows for Indigenous Peoples and local communities (CIFs, GEF).

**Gaps**

- There are multiple barriers for Indigenous Peoples and local communities to access climate financing: fiduciary requirements designed for Global North organizations, combined with complex administrative processes, language barriers, and the unfounded perception of higher risk ([Forest Declaration Assessment, 2024](#); [Monterroso, 2025](#)).
- Even when resources do arrive, they can reproduce dependencies if the agenda is not territorialized and the capacity of Peoples to manage them directly is not recognized, instead relying primarily on intermediaries ([Monterroso, 2025](#)).

<b>Implementation Axis: Finance for forests and financial flows alignment</b>	
<b>Guaranteed Access to Forest Financing for Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities</b>	<b>No. 3.3</b>
	<p>→ The project-based approach of existing direct access mechanisms is limited in providing a constant and predictable resource aligned with territorial plans and long-term needs of Indigenous Peoples and, where applicable, local communities (<a href="#">COICA, 2025</a>; <a href="#">Forest Peoples Programme, 2025</a>).</p>
<b>Solutions</b>	
<p> <b>Global</b></p>	
<p>Create civil society advocacy strategies, together with Indigenous Peoples and local communities, so that decisions and guidance directed toward multilateral banks and climate funds move toward the transition to/establishment of direct access agreements (as opposed to direct access windows) that provide access to funds in a flexible manner and for long periods, rather than short-term project-based access.</p>	
<p>Develop and operationalize, in those instances where dedicated windows for Indigenous Peoples and local communities already exist, transition plans toward direct access agreements that provide financing over long time horizons (10 years) to align financing with projects and traditional life plans beyond a single project. Where these windows do not exist, as in the case of the Green Climate Fund, proceed directly with the development of such agreements.</p>	
<p>Advocacy for decisions in multilateral banks and climate funds (civil society); development or transition toward direct access agreements (multilateral banks and climate funds).</p>	

## Enabling Environment for Implementation and Regional Forest Management

The targets prioritized in this document offer a strategic window for the global Roadmap to accelerate action in areas critical to Latin America: territorial rights and PIACI; deforestation- and conversion-free supply chains; finance for forests and financial flow alignment. However, advancing on these targets depends on a broader set of enabling conditions that strengthen regional forest management as a whole.

The enabling environment must help the forest agenda enter into decisions on development, financing, trade, territorial security, adaptation, energy, and infrastructure. The region already has NDCs, NBSAPs, deforestation control strategies, forest plans, land use planning instruments, restoration targets, voluntary land degradation neutrality targets, monitoring systems, regional platforms, financial mechanisms, and environmental democracy frameworks -and has achieved progress in domestic reforms, monitoring, restoration, results-based financing, community forestry, agroforestry, and control of certain forest loss hotspots. The challenge is to ensure these instruments operate more cohesively against the real drivers of forest loss and degradation: productive pressure, opaque supply chains, misaligned financing, illegal economies, territorial insecurity, degradation, fires, unplanned infrastructure, and insufficiently guaranteed rights.

### a. Planning, Monitoring, and Territorial Response

The Roadmap must drive implementation measures for the 2027–2030 period within existing instruments, with milestones, responsible parties, available resources, indicators, and follow-up. These measures must be grounded in updated territorial diagnostics and focused on pre-existing hotspots of loss and degradation, critical corridors, high-conflict zones, and territories where illegal economies, fires, productive expansion, infrastructure, tenure insecurity, and low institutional capacity converge.

Monitoring must move from reporting to response. National systems, forest inventories, satellite platforms, BTRs, land registries, cadastres, traceability, [MapBiomass](#), [RAISG](#), [MAAP](#), the [Regional Amazon Observatory](#), and community monitoring, among other mechanisms, should serve to identify accumulated pressure, anticipate risks, orient budgets, prioritize enforcement, activate early warnings, sustain restoration, and guide land use decisions.

The critical point is to close the loop between planning, monitoring, enforcement operations, and follow-up. Alerts for coverage loss, degradation, fires, or mining should activate protocols that mobilize environmental, territorial, judicial, financial, productive, customs, and security authorities. This includes coordinated operations in identified persistent hotspots, investigation of organized networks, traceability of risk products, control of ultimate beneficial owners, and tracking of financial flows.

The region already has capacities to sustain this response: alert systems, enforcement mechanisms, sectoral measures, environmental prosecutors, environmental authorities, financial intelligence units, customs services, traceability systems, [the Latin American Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Network \(Red LAFICA\)](#), the [Special Commission on Public Security and Cross-Border and Transnational Illicit Activities in the Amazon Region \(CESPIT\)](#), INTERPOL, AMERIPOL, UNODC, and international operations against environmental crimes. The priority is to articulate these capacities in a sustained territorial action architecture, with cross-border cooperation, financing, data interoperability, and controls that reduce the displacement of illicit activities to other zones or jurisdictions.

This response must distinguish between networks that finance, and scale forest loss, and rights-holders or vulnerable territorial actors who require protection, economic alternatives, and rights guarantees. Action against illegal economies must avoid the criminalization of smallholder farmers, indigenous peoples, Afro-descendants, peasants, or local communities facing coercion, state absence, or economic dependency. The priority is to pursue structures, flows, intermediaries, and illegal markets, while strengthening rights, territorial governance, and livelihoods.

## **b. Rights, Territorial Legitimacy, and Implementation Safeguards**

Regional forest management needs a solid foundation of rights. The legal protection of tenure, PIACI recognition, deforestation-free supply chains, financial mechanisms, energy transition, infrastructure, and restoration all depend on clear rules on territorial rights, own governance, effective participation, transparency, consent, benefit distribution, and protection of defenders.

The region has international standards, inter-American frameworks, national instruments, ILO Convention 169, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas, the Escazú Agreement, climate safeguards, and REDD+ frameworks. However, gaps persist in legal recognition, tenure security, consultation quality, rights over carbon and benefits, information access, direct access to financing, and effective protection of defenders.

The Roadmap must place the rights-based approach at the center of forest implementation. This requires recognizing Indigenous Peoples, PIACI, Afro-descendant communities, tribal peoples, peasant, rural, traditional, and local communities as rights-holders, with safeguards in accordance with their legal frameworks and territorial realities.

[Free, Prior, and Informed Consent \(FPIC\)](#) must function as a substantive guarantee in decisions affecting lands, resources, forests, livelihoods, sacred sites, infrastructure, carbon, biodiversity, or energy projects. It should be conducted through authorities recognized by the community itself, with accessible and culturally appropriate information, timelines compatible with their own deliberation, and clear documentation of agreements, disagreements, and obligations.

Benefit distribution must be consolidated as a condition of legitimacy. REDD+, results-based payments, carbon markets, biodiversity credits, TFFF, GCF, GEF, development banks, and territorial funds require clear rules on ownership, benefits, co-benefits, carbon rights, traceability, transparency, and accountability. Direct financing to legitimate territorial governance structures, or through intermediaries chosen by rights-holders themselves, reduces excessive intermediation and strengthens territorial ownership.

The protection of defenders must be integrated into the implementation architecture. The Escazú Agreement, particularly its Article 9<sup>3</sup>, must be translated into mechanisms for prevention, collective protection, reparation, sanction, risk monitoring, and coordination between environmental, judicial, territorial, security, and peoples' authorities.

### **c. Adaptation, Degradation, and Territorial Resilience**

Adaptation must be incorporated as an enabling condition in the regional forest agenda. Forests sustain water regulation, soil protection, ecological connectivity, food security, risk reduction, livelihoods, ecosystem health, and territorial stability. In a context of increased climate vulnerability - with droughts, fires, floods, and land degradation - protecting forests also constitutes an adaptation strategy.

The Roadmap must integrate forests, biodiversity, soils, and water into climate and territorial planning, connecting NAPs, NDCs, the Global Adaptation Goal, NBSAPs, land degradation neutrality, land use planning, and risk management. This integration provides better visibility into forest degradation, which typically receives less attention than coverage loss, although it affects carbon, biodiversity, water, productivity, ecological integrity, livelihoods, and fire vulnerability.

The regional agenda must advance toward monitoring and planning systems that measure more than deforestation. Degradation, fires, fragmentation, loss of ecological integrity, and climate risk must be incorporated as decision variables to prioritize territories where the loss of forest functionality compromises water security, connectivity, community resilience, and livelihoods, and to mobilize adaptation financing with verifiable benefits.

### **d. Synergies Between Just Energy Transition, Infrastructure, Mining, and Forests**

The energy transition and the forest agenda intersect in decisions about development, energy access, bioenergy, biofuels, infrastructure, fossil fuel expansion, renewable energy, transmission, mining, restoration, and project closure. For Latin America, this

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<sup>3</sup> Art. 9: "Human rights defenders in environmental matters: 1. Each Party shall guarantee a safe and enabling environment for persons, groups and organizations that promote and defend human Regional Agreement on Access to Information, Public Participation and Access to Justice in Environmental Affairs in Latin America and the Caribbean 24 rights in environmental matters, so that they are able to act free from threat, restriction and insecurity. 2. Each Party shall take adequate and effective measures to recognize, protect and promote all the rights of human rights defenders in environmental matters, including their right to life, personal integrity, freedom of opinion and expression, peaceful assembly and association, and free movement, as well as their ability to exercise their access rights, taking into account its international obligations in the field of human rights, its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system. 3. Each Party shall also take appropriate, effective and timely measures to prevent, investigate and punish attacks, threats or intimidations that human rights defenders in environmental matters may suffer while exercising the rights set out in the present Agreement".

relationship must be addressed from a territorial, nature-based, and justice perspective, recognizing that many forest territories face a double pressure: energy poverty and exposure to extractive or infrastructure projects that can increase forest loss and degradation.

The Roadmap should promote common criteria for energy development to be compatible with forest protection, biodiversity, water, soils, and territorial rights. This involves assessing cumulative impacts; incorporating forest criteria in permits, energy planning, and investment decisions; guaranteeing prior consultation and binding participation where applicable; ensuring verifiable territorial benefits; and requiring closure plans, restoration, liability remediation, and socioeconomic transition for territories dependent on fossil or mining activities.

Decisions on bioenergy and biofuels require special attention. Their expansion can contribute to the transition if it is based on strict sustainability, food security, ecosystem protection, efficient use of residues, and the non-conversion of forests or other natural ecosystems. Without these safeguards, it can increase pressure on land, water, agricultural supply chains, and territories of high ecological or cultural value.

Territories of high ecological and social value -including life zones, extraction-free zones, or other equivalent designations -can orient this agenda. These are areas where ecological integrity, water security, biodiversity, climate resilience, the presence of people and communities, territorial governance, and latent extractive threats justify reinforced safeguards against new fossil, mining, energy, or infrastructure pressures.

This synergy allows connecting both roadmaps promoted by the Presidency. An energy transition compatible with forests must expand access to safe and affordable energy, reduce extractive pressures on critical territories, prioritize distributed or community-based alternatives where relevant, and recognize that nature protection is a condition for resilience, development, and a just transition in the region. Moreover, it allows building on existing designations in each country's regulatory frameworks, proposing strategies for articulation between different land-use planning instruments, and consolidating advances in key bio-regions, such as the declaration of the Colombian Amazon as free of gas and oil in 2025, as references for the region.

### **e. Regional and Global Cooperation to Scale Implementation**

Regional and global cooperation -particularly the obligation of developed countries to provide means of implementation to developing countries -is a precondition for achieving deforestation- and conversion-free supply chains at the regional level.

On one hand, in the region, forest loss linked to supply chains operates in a cross-border manner, as in the case of timber trade, cattle, gold extraction and other risk products, illegal mining, money laundering, fires, wildlife trafficking, infrastructure, pressure on shared biomes, and the displacement of illicit activities between jurisdictions.


On the other hand, developed countries and large exporting countries must take clear actions both against elements that exacerbate deforestation risk factors, and regarding

their responsibility in providing means of implementation that enable developing countries to have the governance capacities and technological instruments that make effective the measures countries in the region implement regarding deforestation-free supply chains.

Thus, the Roadmap must organize cooperation around concrete implementation problems. At the North-South cooperation level, developed countries must establish clear pathways for financing and strengthening technical, institutional, and technological capacities so that producing countries can effectively implement their due diligence and traceability frameworks; trade agreements that weaken zero-deforestation standards should be reviewed and renegotiated; coordination between Global North importing countries should be promoted to avoid trade bifurcation toward partners without regulations; and structural demand-reduction and sustainable consumption promotion measures should be adopted to reduce pressure on primary commodities associated with deforestation.

At the South-South cooperation level within the region, mechanisms such as forums or other cooperation spaces should be pursued to identify points of convergence and divergence regarding standards, monitoring capacities, and traceability of high-risk primary commodity supply chains, to develop from these meetings common standards that facilitate cross-border traceability, customs control, information exchange, and relevant legislative modifications. This space can also play a crucial role in identifying, sharing, and scaling existing national traceability platforms at the regional level, recognizing that regional forest cooperation has historically been weak and that advancing it requires building sustained political will among the region's countries.

Cooperation must also sustain the territorial planning, monitoring, and response cycle: information exchange on persistent forest loss fronts, fires, illicit activities, and harmful financing; technical and financial support for monitoring and interoperability; judicial, customs, and financial cooperation against cross-border networks; and platforms to share learning on tenure, PIACI, direct access, benefit distribution, community monitoring, REDD+, bioeconomy, restoration, and enforcement.



## The Amazon as a Regional and Global Cooperation Priority

The Amazon requires specific attention due to its systemic relevance, proximity to critical ecological thresholds, and active regional architecture. The Amazon region has the [Belém Declaration](#), the Bogotá Declaration, ACTO, CESPIT, observatories, monitoring networks, cooperation mechanisms, and territorial experiences in deforestation control, fire management, indigenous and community governance, restoration, bioeconomy, and forest management.

This foundation can become an implementation platform if oriented toward common regional references, data interoperability, official, scientific, and community monitoring, response protocols, cross-border cooperation, coordinated financing, safeguards, and follow-up. Approximately 18% of the Amazon forest has been deforested, and approximately 38% of the remaining forest is degraded; as deforestation approaches a threshold of 20–25%, combined with degradation, fires, and climate change, the biome could lose critical climatic, water, and ecological functions. The Roadmap can channel technical and financial cooperation toward critical pan-Amazonian territories, with verifiable results in reducing forest loss and degradation, improving fire management, enhancing ecosystem connectivity, controlling illegal economies, implementing IP&LC rights, protecting PIACI, strengthening territorial governance, and aligning financing.

Taken together, these enabling conditions aim to ensure that the agenda to halt and reverse deforestation by 2030 moves forward with greater capacity to deliver results.

## From Mandate to Implementation: A Latin American Contribution to Strengthen the Global Roadmap

The target of halting and reversing forest deforestation and degradation by 2030 already is a political mandate. What follows is converting it into an implementation agenda capable of orienting decisions, mobilizing support, and generating verifiable results this decade. This contribution, backed by Latin American civil society organizations, seeks to contribute to that effort from a regional perspective.

The targets presented identify areas in which Latin America can advance with greater political and operational clarity. These targets do not seek to open a parallel agenda, but

rather to help existing commitments translate into concrete actions that can be owned by countries and backed by cooperation, financing, and follow-up.

We propose that the Global Roadmap acts as a bridge between national and regional instruments and international cooperation. To this end, we urge that the process have an inclusive governance framework oriented toward results, capable of identifying countries and actors willing to advance, particularly those with the greatest forest predilection, as well as the commercial, economic, and political counterparts that define the environmental footprint of timber and key primary commodities supply chains. It should also connect technical and financial support, facilitate learning across regions, and track progress toward implementation targets by 2030. The Roadmap must offer a clear signal: those who decide to raise their ambition, update or strengthen existing instruments, and advance on implementation targets must have political, technical, and financial backing.

Likewise, this framework must articulate the multilateral follow-up dimension with implementation. It should serve to assess progress against the mandate of the Global Stocktake (GST1, 2023) and generate useful inputs for GST2 (2028), in coordination with the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Convention to Combat Desertification, the UN Forum on Forests, and other spaces with relevant targets, data, capacities, and mandates. It should also activate the implementation architecture outside of negotiations: action agendas, regional platforms, development banks, international cooperation, forest initiatives, Indigenous Peoples, local communities, civil society, and non-state actors.

Latin America already participates in many of these pieces: forest cooperation, REDD+, restoration, monitoring, climate financing, and voluntary initiatives. But that sum of spaces has not closed the structural gaps driving forest loss. The Roadmap can add value if it organizes that architecture around concrete targets and a paradigm shift: treating forests as a development, productive transformation, territorial security, and economic alignment agenda. To advance, it must help connect financial reconversion, the redirection of harmful subsidies, trade rules, traceability, the control of illegal economies, and the protection of territorial rights. This is the type of articulation that can convert multilateralism into implementation-building blocks useful for the region.

We also propose that the two Presidency roadmaps converge and dialogue more explicitly amongst each other. The just energy transition and the forest agenda intersect in development decisions on land-use planning, financing, infrastructure, bioenergy, transition minerals, extraction-free zones, and the protection of strategic ecosystems. The Santa Marta Conference showed that, when political will exists, it is possible to bring together countries willing to advance, generate visibility, activate scientific backing, connect technical support through the NDC Partnership and other international instances and bodies, mobilize philanthropy, and bring multiple actors around an implementation agenda. The forest agenda requires a similar effort to energize political will, identify leading countries and actors, and turn the roadmap into a support platform for concrete targets. For Latin America, this articulation is key: an energy transition that does not speak with nature, rights, and land use can transfer pressures to new territories; and a forest agenda that does not speak with energy and productive transformation can become isolated from the economic decisions that explain much of forest loss.

Latin America has shown that when the forest agenda receives political attention, national decisions, regional alliances, financing, and capacities can move. The new moment opened

by the global Roadmap offers an opportunity to sustain that momentum, correct persistent gaps, and position forests as part of development, climate security, territorial justice, and productive transformation agendas.

We present this contribution to the COP30 Presidency with the expectation of opening a constructive conversation with governments, regional institutions, United Nations agencies, international cooperation, development banks, indigenous peoples, local communities, civil society, and other relevant actors. The proposed targets seek to guide the design of the Roadmap, identify implementation alliances, and position Latin America as a region that contributes concrete proposals to accelerate action.

The opportunity is concrete: to leverage the new political momentum on forests to strengthen existing commitments, activate implementation mechanisms, and show progress before 2030. If the Roadmap succeeds in orienting priorities, connecting efforts, and sustaining follow-up, it can help the global forest target shift from a broad mandate to a common agenda, indispensable for keeping the 1.5°C objective within reach.

## Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACTO	Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization
CDP	Carbon Disclosure Project
CESPIT	Special Commission on Public Security and Cross-Border and Transnational Illicit Activities in the Amazon Region
CIFs	Climate Investment Funds
CNTI	National Commission on Indigenous Territories (Colombia)
COICA	Coordinator of Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon Basin
DNS	Debt-for-Nature Swaps
ESG	Environmental, Social, and Governance criteria
EUDR	European Union Deforestation Regulation
FCLP	Forest & Climate Leaders' Partnership
FPIC	Free, Prior, and Informed Consent
GBFF	Global Biodiversity Framework Fund
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GEF	Global Environment Facility
HR	Human Rights
IACHR	Inter-American Commission on Human Rights

ICJ	International Court of Justice
ILO	International Labour Organization
JREDD+	Jurisdictional REDD+
LDN	Land Degradation Neutrality
MDBs	Multilateral Development Banks
NAP	National Adaptation Plans
NBSAP	National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan
NDC	Nationally Determined Contribution
PES	Payment for Environmental Services
PIACI	Indigenous Peoples in Voluntary Isolation and Initial Contact
REDD+	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
TFA	Tropical Forest Alliance
TFFF	Tropical Forest Forever Facility
TNFD	Taskforce on Nature-related Financial Disclosures
UN	United Nations
UNDRIP	United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples

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## Signatory organizations

1. Amazon Conservation Team (ACT)
2. AIDA
3. Alianza Cuencas Sagradas Amazónicas (ASHA)
4. Argentina 1.5
5. Asociación Ambiente y Sociedad
6. Asopargolmo
7. Centro Mexicano de Derecho Ambiental A.C.
8. Climate Action Network - Latinoamérica
9. Coalición Colombiana por el Derecho a la Educación
10. Corporación Bioed
11. Dejusticia
12. Equal Right
13. Espacio Quinde
14. Federación de Organizaciones de la Nacionalidad Kichwa de provincia de Sucumbios, Ecuador (FONAKISE)
15. Frente Si si al de Acción Climática
16. Fundación Ambiental Mohan-Cuidadores del Agua
17. Fundación Chile Sustentable
18. Good Health Community Programmes
19. Habitat Sivar
20. Instituto Igarapé
21. Instituto Talanoa
22. LACLIMA
23. Plantemos
24. Plataforma CIPÓ
25. Quantum Leap (Fundación Quantum)
26. Red de Adolescentes y Jóvenes Indígenas de Amazonas - RAJIA
27. Red de Jóvenes por los ODS
28. Rede de Mulheres Ambientalistas da América Latina - Elo Brasil
29. Resource Justice Network

30. Soluciones Estratégicas Sustentables
31. The Climate Reality Project America Latina
32. Transforma
33. Unión de Afectados y Afectadas por Operaciones Petroleras-UDAPT
34. Uno Punto Cinco
35. Youth4energy
36. Youth for Sustainable Travel
37. WWF América Latina y el Caribe